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speculations; and is hardly entitled to take rank as an axiom in
the jurisprudence of this country. I believe universal observation
will attest that for the last quarter of a century competition has
caused more individual distress, if not more public injury, than the
want of, competition. Indeed, by reducing prices below, or raising
them above values, competition has done more to monopolize trade
or to secure exclusive advantages in it, than has been done by contract. Rivalry in trade will destroy itself; and rival trades, seeking
to remove each other, rarely resort to contract, unless they find it
the cheapest mode of putting an end to strife :" Kellogg v. Larkin,
8 Pinney 124, 150.
However valuable these observations may be to the profession,
they can be considered but mere dicta, coming from able judges,
and reflecting the sentiment of a class of thinkers considerably in
advance of the notions of a majority of judges who have given
opinions upon this subject, as an examination of the adjudged cases
will show.
EUGENE McQUILLiN.

St. Louis, Mo:
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SNOW v. WHITEHEAD.
Houses belonging to A. and B. adjoined one another. A. allowed water to collect in his ccllar so that it found its way into B.'s cellar which adjoined, but was
somewhat deeper. Yield, that A. was liable to pay damages to B. for the injury so
done to him. Ballardv. Tomlinson, 26 Oh. 1D. 194, differed from.

of action.
This was an action, the main object of which was to enforce
the provisions of a covenant affecting certain land, to the effect
that no house should be erected upon any part of the land ,f a
less value than 4001. Damages were also claimed by the plaintiff on the following grounds: In constructing one of the houses
(referred to as B. in the evidence) on the land in question, the
defendants excavated the ground so as to form a cellar, and put
pipes to carry off the water which were not connected with any
drain. The rain came down these pipes, flowed into the cellar,
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and collected there in a considerable pool. The plaintiff built a
house adjoining this house of the defendants. The water in the
pool never touched the party-wall. The plaintiff had a cellar of
his. own under the house adjoining B., which was somewhat deeper
than the cellar under B., and the water which the defendants allowed
to collect in the cellar of the house B. found its way into the cellar
of the plaintiff's adjoining house, and he was put to some expense
in getting rid of this water which so came to the cellar of his house.
The plaintiff made a claim in this action for damages for the injury
so done to him.
The main question, as to whether the houses erected upon the
land were in conformity with the covenant, turned upon the evidence.
As to the damage caused by the water, an important question
arose in consequence of the recent decision in Ballard v. Tomlinson, 26 Ch. D. 194, by Mr. Justice PEARSON.
Graham Hastings, Q. 0., and Yryer, for the plaintiffs.
Robinson, Q. C., and Boome, for the defendant.
KAY, J., in a written judgment (after reviewing the evidence),
decided that the covenant as to the value of the houses bad not been
observed by the defendants, and then proceeded to deal with the
question as to the percolation of the water. After stating the facts
as above, his lordship proceeded as follows:
The question is whether that was a wrong, and on the part of
defendant I was referred to the case, before PEARSON, J., of Ballard v. Tomlinson, 26 Ch. Div. 194, as deciding that it was not a
wrong in law in respect of which an action would lie. I have read
that case more than once with very great interest and attention,
and, with all respect to the learned judge who decided it, I am
clearly of opinion that I am bound by authorities of great weight,
and not only of considerable antiquity, but also decisions of higher
tribunals, which seem to me inconsistent with that decision. The
law is very ancient, and is expressed in the maxim, "Sic utere tuo
ut alienum non lmdas." In the old case of Tenant v. Golding, 1
Salk. 21, 360, it is stated, "the plaintiff declared that be was possessed of a cellar contiguous to the defendant's privy, and parted
by a wall, part of the defendant's house, which the defendant debuit
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et solebat reparare; and that for want of repair the filth of the
privy ran into his, cellar, &c. ; and after a writ of inquiry it was
moved in arrest of judgment that this being a charge laid upon
the owner himself, the plaintiff should have shown a title by prescription; sed non allocatur,for it is a charge laid on the defendant
of common right which, by law, he is subject to. As one is bound
to keep his cattle from trespassing on his neighbor's ground, so he
must a heap of dung, if he erects it."

HOLT, C. J., gave judgment

for the plaintiff, saying: "The xeason he gave for his'judgment in
the principal case was because it was the defendant's wall and the
defendant's filth, and he was bound of common right to keep his
wall so as his filth might not damnify his neighbor; 'and that it
was a trespass on his neighbor; as if his beasts should escape or one
should make a great heap on the border of his ground and it should
tumble and roll down upon his neighbor's. That the case might,
indeed, possibly be such that the defendant might not be bound to
repair, as if the plaintiff made a new cellar under the defendant's
old privy or in a vacant piece of ground which lay- next the old
privy before, in such case the defendant must defend himself. But
that cannot be the case here, for then he could not be bound to
repair, and upon the words debet reparare he must be acquitted
on the trial. But, on the other side, if A. has two houses and the
house of office on the one is contiguous to the cellar of the other,
but defended by a wall, and he sells this house with the house of
office, the vendee must repair the wall; so if he keeps this and sells
the other, he himself must repair the wall of the house of office, for
he whose dirt it is must keep it that it may not trespass." That
case was considered with several other decisions, which are all
referred to in the judgment in Bylands v. Pletcher,L. R., 3 H. L.
330, which was a case of a man making a reservoir on his own land
near to a neighbor's mine and the water which was introduced into
the reservoir breaking through some of the shafts flooded the mine;
and there Lord Chancellor CAIRNS, in giving judgment, stated the
principles upon which he thought that case should be determined,
and in doing so referred to the judgment delivered in the same
case by Mr. Justice BLACKBURN, which, in effect, was that the
neighbor who ha brought something on his property which was
not naturally there, harmless to others so long as it is confined to
his own property, but which he knows to be mischievous if it gets
on his neighbors, "must keep it in at his peril," and should be
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obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own property.
Those authorities, which are of the highest possible kind, have
recognised, and again and again affirmed, the rule that any one who
brings on his land that which, in a natural state of the land, would
not be there-whether it be filth, or water, or anything else-is
bound to keep it there, and answerable if it escapes in any way and
injures the land of a neighbor,, unless it be owing to the neighbor's
default. It would be very easy, perhaps, to draw some kind of
distinction between Ballard v. Tomlinson and those authorities,
but I am entirely unable to see any distinction in principle. The
short facts of that case were that the plaintiff and the defendant
were the owners of adjoining lands, and each having on his land a
well of a depth of three hundred feet. The distance between the
wells was ninety-nine yards, the plaintiff's land being at a lower
level than the defendant's. The defendant turned sewage from his
house into his well, and it polluted the water in the plaintiff's well.
The defendant did not observe the rule that having brought upon
his land filth he was bound to keep it there, and to see that it did not
get in any way whatever on to his neighbor's land. The argument
in that case seemed to be that the defendant's polluted water would
not have got to the other well if his neighbor had not taken water
out of his own well, and that by taking water out of his well he
drew the water from his neighbor's well on to his own land through
his neighbor's land; but he had a right to pump as much water as
he liked from his own well. It has been decided that if a man
pumps water from his- own land, and by so doing drains his neighbor's well dry, there is no wrong or harm in respect of 'which his
neighbor can maintain an action. But if one neighbor poisons
his own land so that anybody in the natural use of his well on
adjoining land has that poison coming into the water in his well,
can it be said that the man who so poisons his land to the injury
of his neighbor is keeping in the filth which he is bound to keep in,
so that it does not escape? I am not able to draw any material
distinction between the case of Ballard v. Tomlinson and the other
authorities to which I have referred, and I therefore prefer to follow the well-known case of Tenant v. Golding, and the series of
cases down to _Bylands v. Fletcher,which affirm very distinctly the
proposition that, as an application of the maxim, "sic utere tuo ut
alienum non lWas," any one who collects upon his own land water
VOL. XXXIII.-30

SNOW v. WHITEHEAD.

or anything else which would not in the natural condition of the
land be collected there, ought to keep it in at his peril ; and that,
if it escapes, he is liable for the consequences. This case seems to
me to come within that principle. The matter is no doubt a trifling
one, and if the plaintiff had not been right upon the other point, I
should not have encouraged him in maintaining an action in this
division of the Iigh Court for so slight an amount of damage,
stated to be between three pounds and four pounds. I assess the
damages at three pounds. It seems to me that the water which
collected in the cellar of the house erected by the defendants was
not kept there by them as it ought to have been, but that it percolated and got into the cellar of the plaintiff's house adjoining
thereto, and that seems to me to be a wrong within the decision in
.ylands v. Fletcher. I accordingly order that the defendants do
pay to the plaintiff three pounds as damages.
The foregoing case apparently decides

that the defendant was liable for the escape of tile water, without any proof of
negligence on his part, and the language
of Rylands v. Fletcher, quoted in the
opinion of KA-Y, J., seems to support
that propooition. If so, it is not universally agreed to in America, and Rylands
v. fletcher has not been always approved,
to its whole extent, at least. For many
very respectable courts hold that a person who lawfully collects water on his
own premises for his own legitimate use,
as the mill-owner who raises a pond on a
running stream, is not liable to an owner
below, if the dam breaks away and floods
'iis premises, unless the owner of the
lam has been guilty of negligence, either
ii the orilinal erection or subsequent
weservation of such dam, and that such
legligence must be affirmatively shown
,y the plaintiff, in order to create such
liability.
Such seems to be the view
held in Livingston v. Adams, 8 Cow.
175; Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y.
476; Marshall v. Weilicood, 38 N. J.
(Law) 339 ; Hoffman v. Toulumne Co.
Voter Co., 10 Cal. 413; Garlandv.
Towne, 55 N. H. 55; Todd v. Cochell,
17 Cal. 97 ; Evereti v. HydraulicFlume

Co., 23 Cal. 225; Lapham v. Curtis, 5
Yerm. 371, and some other cases.
But of course, where such rule prevails, the degree of care and prudence
required of the millowner must be proportioned to the circumstances of each
case, and his dam must be properly constructed and maintained for that particular stream, and if the latter is known to
be subject to extraordinary and severe
freshets, he must construct his dam in a
manner naturally calculated to withstand
such extraordinary freshets as well as
others, even though they may occur at
very irregular intervals and only once
in several years: Gray v. Harris, 107
Mass. 492.
And see Mayor of New
York v. Bailey, 2 Denio 433. Or, as
stated in Srewsbury v. Smith, 12 Cush.
177, the owners of a dam are responsible for that degree of care, skill
and diligence in the construction and
maintenance of their dam which men of
common and ordinary prudence would
exercise in their own affairs in reference
to similar subjects, or such as a-man
would use if he owned the dam and also
the property below.
Oin the other hand a more stringent
rule has been sometimes applied in such

